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NOTES
THE ELECTION BALLOT AS A FORUM FOR THE
EXPRESSION OF IDEAS-GEORGES V. CARNEY
The election ballot' traditionally has been recognized as the vehicle by
which voters select candidates and either adopt or reject propositions or
measures.2 In a broader sense, however, the ballot also may be viewed as
a means for voters to express their opinions on various matters of public
policy.3 Candidates who are closely identified with a particular issue or cause
often have placed their names on the ballot to provide voters with an op-
portunity to cast a protest vote or to "send a message" to their leaders.4
Recently, a coalition of citizen groups, advocating a halt to the testing,
production, and development of nuclear weapons, has attempted to use the
ballot to send a message to the national leadership on the subject of the
nuclear arms race.' These groups have attempted to place propositions on
state and local ballots throughout the nation asking voters to register their
approval or disapproval of a freeze on nuclear weapons.' Unlike most ballot
1. The word ballot is derived from the Greek word ballo which means to throw. Ex Parte
Owens, 148 Ala. 402, 410, 42 So. 676, 678 (1906). In ancient Greece, ballots consisted of shells,
balls, pebbles, or beans cast into boxes as a means of voting in legislative and judicial bodies.
Id. Some early laws in colonial America provided for ballots consisting of an Indian corn
(for an affirmative vote) and a bean (for a negative vote). City of Detroit v. Inspectors of
Election, 139 Mich. 548, 552, 102 N.W. 1029, 1031 (1905).
2. See, e.g., Straughan v. Meyers, 268 Mo. 580, 589, 187 S.W. 1159, 1162 (1916) (ballot
is means by which person votes); Richardson v. Caputo, 46 N.J. 3, 9, 214 A.2d 385, 388
(1965) (ballot permits voters to record their will); City of Wellsville v. Connor, 91 Ohio St.
28, 33, 109 N.E. 526, 527 (1914) (ballot is instrument by which voter expresses his choice be-
tween candidates or on questions); Porter v. Oklahoma. City, 446 P.2d 384, 391 (Okla. 1968)
(ballot is an instrumentality that records voter's choice for or against a candidate or proposition).
3. The assertion that the act of voting is an expression of opinion on issues, as well as
an expression of preference for certain candidates, is supported by studies which have documented
the increasingly important role that political issues play in determining voter behavior. See
generally N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1976) (today's
voters generally are aware of political issues and are likely to rely on their own positions with
respect to issues in deciding which candidates to support).
4. The 1968 presidential candidacy of Senator Eugene McCarthy, who campaigned largely
on an anti-Vietnam War platform, is a classic illustration. The appearance of his name on
several state primary ballots provided many voters with an opportunity to voice opposition,
through the ballot box, to American military involvement in Vietnam. See T. WHTE, THE
MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 at 182-203 (1969).
5. By placing nonbinding proposals on the ballot, the groups hope to gain publicity for
the nuclear arms freeze movement and demonstrate to the nation's policy makers that there
is widespread popular support for a "freeze" on the development, production, and deployment
of nuclear weapons. See N.Y. Times, May 4, 1982, at A23, col. I.
6. To a large extent, the nuclear arms freeze advocates have been successful in their ballot
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 32:901
propositions,7 however, the nuclear arms freeze proposals have no binding
effect; they merely solicit the voters' opinions on the nuclear arms freeze
issue. The existence of these measures raises a number of first amendment
and equal protection issues regarding the extent to which a state can regulate
access to the ballot for citizen-sponsored advisory questions.' The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently became the first court to address
these issues when it upheld an Illinois law that made it virtually impossible
for citizens to place nonbinding advisory questions on local ballots.' In
access efforts. A full one-quarter of the nation's voters were able to express an opinion on
the nuclear freeze issue when they cast their ballots in the November 1982 general election.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1982, at E20, col. I. The freeze resolution appeared on the ballot in
nine states and many localities including Cook County, Illinois; Suffolk County, New York;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Washington, D.C. Id. For the most part, voters supported
the proposals, sometimes by overwhelming margins. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, at A22, col.
4; see also Chicago Tribune, Nov. 4, 1982, § 1, at 18, col. 1 (67% of Cook County, Illinois,
voters supported freeze question).
7. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
8. Generally, the states have broad powers to regulate elections. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pon-
tikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973) (Constitution entrusts to states the administration of the electoral
process); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (power to regulate state elections reserved
to the states by the tenth amendment); U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 4 (time, place, and manner of
holding congressional elections determined by states subject to congressional supervision). Until
recently, federal courts were extremely reluctant to intervene in state electoral processes. See,
e.g., MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (per curiam) (state law upheld requiring 200
signatures from each of at least 50 counties to form a new political party); Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946) (plurality opinion) (Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear challenge
to state law prescribing malapportioned congressional districts); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1 (1944) (candidate denied certification as nominee due to unlawful administration of state
election law not entitled to relief under fourteenth amendment); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether state initiative
violates guaranty clause).
This hands-off approach was completely discarded, however, after the landmark decision
in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Baker Court held that the federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear equal protection challenges to state election laws. Although states still have
extensive powers of supervision over elections, those powers must be exercised in a manner
that does not infringe upon constitutional rights. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51
(1973) (law prohibiting "cross-over voting" in primary elections violates first amendment right
of association); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one-year residence requirement for
voters unduly burdens right to vote and right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax violates equal protection). Consequently, state election laws that
restrict ballot access have been declared invalid. See, e.g., Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (system which requires new political parties and indepen-
dent candidates to collect more signatures to appear on ballot in city elections than in statewide
elections violates first and fourteenth amendments); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (fil-
ing fee requirements for candidates violate first and fourteenth amendments); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968) (laws making ballot access nearly impossible for third party candidates violate
equal protection and first amendment rights). For an analysis of Supreme Court review of
state election laws through 1969, see R. CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL
PROCESS (1970).
9. Georges v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'g 546 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ill.
1982). There is only one reported case of a federal constitutional challenge to a law restricting
ballot access for propositions. In Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group v. Secretary of
the Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 85, 375 N.E.2d 1175 (1978), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
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Georges v. Carney,'" the court of appeals held that a state has no federal
constitutional obligation to make the election ballot available to citizens as
a public forum for first amendment expression. 1' The court left open the
possibility, however, that an election ballot could become a public forum
if the state provided for nonbinding initiatives.' 2
This Note will analyze the Georges decision and attempt to determine its
effect on citizen ballot access rights and on the concept of the ballot as
a first amendment public forum. First, it will summarize the state of the
law regarding citizen-sponsored ballot propositions,' 3 ballot access for political
candidates,' 4 and public forums.' A discussion of Georges will follow, with
an analysis and critique disapproving of the reasoning employed by the
court.' 6 Finally, this Note will examine Georges's probable effect on future
cases involving citizen-sponsored ballot propositions and the first amend-
ment public forum theory.' 7
BACKGROUND
Citizen-Sponsored Ballot Propositions
Approximately twenty-one states allow citizens to propose state laws by
petition and to enact them by direct vote independent of the legislature.' 8
Court rejected a challenge to a county distribution requirement which restricted the number
of signatures that could be collected from any one county on a petition to place a binding
proposition on the statewide ballot. The court held that the law did not violate the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause because no fundamental interest was involved. Id. at 96,
375 N.E.2d at 1182.
10. 691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1982).
11. Id. at 302.
12. Id. at 301.
13. See infra notes 18-53 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 84-115 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 116-206 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
18. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-8; ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1; ARK. CONST.
amend. 7, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 2, §§ 8-10; CoLo. CONST. art. V, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art.
III, § 1; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, §§ 18-20; MASS. CONST. amend. arts. 48, 74, 81; MICH.
CONST. art. 2, § 9; Mo. CONST. art. 3, §§ 49-53; MONT. CONsT. art. V, § 1; NEB. CONST.
art. III, §§ 1-4; NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-9; OHIO CONST. art.
II, §§ 1-1(g); OKLA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 1-8; ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. 11,
§ 1; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1; WASH. CONST. amends. 7, 30; WYo. CONST. art. 3, § 52.
Fifteen of these states also permit citizens to propose and enact state constitutional amend-
ments: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. See TIE COUN-
CIL OF THE STATES, THE BOOK OF THE STATES (1982-83) at 137 [hereinafter cited as THE COUN-
CIL OF THE STATES]. In addition, Florida and Illinois provide their citizens with the power to
initiate constitutional amendments, but do not allow them to propose and enact state legisla-
tion. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. 14, § 3. An effort recently was made
to amend the Illinois Constitution to allow legislative proposals by petition. This attempt was
thwarted, however, by an Illinois appellate court which held that the Illinois Constitution did
not permit amendments that would affect the state legislature's power. Lousin v. State Bd.
of Elections, 108 Ill. App. 3d 496, 503, 438 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (1st Dist. 1982). For a detailed
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In addition, citizens in those states, and in most other states, have the power
to propose and vote upon certain kinds of local laws. 9 This method of enact-
ing legislation, known as the initiative,2" was adopted by a number of states
at the turn of the century to provide a check on state legislatures, which
were perceived as corrupt and unresponsive to the will of the electorate.2 1
explanation of state initiative procedures and provisions, see Note, Initiative and Referendum-Do
They Encourage or Impair Better State Government?, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 925 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Initiative and Referendum].
19. Many of the state constitutions that grant citizens the power to propose and enact state
legislation give citizens the same broad authority to sponsor local laws as well. See ARIz.
CONST. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § 1; CALIF. CONST. art. 2, § 11; COLO.
CONST. art. V, § 1; NEV. CONST. amend. XIX, § 4; OHIO CONST. art. 11, § I(f); OKLA. CONST.
art. 5, § 5-5(a); ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1. In contrast, the Maine
Constitution merely grants cities the option of adopting an initiative procedure. ME. CONST.
art. IV, pt. 3, § 21. In a number of other states, the power of citizens to propose local or-
dinances is derived from statutory law. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 43, §§ 37-41
(West 1968 & Supp. 1982-83) (ordinances may be initiated by petition in any city); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 40:69A-184 (1967) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.17.260 (1965) (ordinances may be
initiated by petition in cities with commission form of government); WIS. STAT. § 9.20 (1981)
(ordinances and resolutions may be initiated by petition in any city). Although many states
do not give citizens this broad grant of authority to initiate local laws, citizens still have the
power in some jurisdictions to propose and enact specific types of local measures. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 28-2-1 (1975) (citizens of a county can propose and enact a law prohibiting the
sale of alcohol in county); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 2442 (1981) (citizens of county may pro-
pose and enact property tax to support a county fair); MICH. ComP. LAWS § 117.21 (1967)
(any existing home rule charter can be amended by initiative). For an examination of local
initiatives, see Bruce, Participation in Local Policy Making: The Case of Referenda, 56 Soc.
Sci. Q. 55 (1975).
20. An initiative may be direct or indirect. A direct initiative allows citizens to place a
proposed measure on the ballot without action by the legislature. See THE COUNCIL OF THE
STATES, supra note 18, at 65. An indirect initiative gives the legislature an opportunity to act
upon the measure before it is voted on by the electorate. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. IV, pt.
3, § 18 (legislature can enact the proposal without change or submit it to the voters together
with an alternative proposal). Of the 21 states that have initiative provisions for state legisla-
tion, 12 have direct initiative procedures, three have indirect procedures, and six provide for
both types of procedures. See THE COUNCIL OF THE STATES, supra note 18, at 65.
Another process by which citizens can vote directly on a measure is the referendum. Id.
at 67 n.a. Under a referendum procedure, voters approve or reject any measure previously
adopted by the legislature. Id. A referendum can take place in one of three ways: (I) voters
can petition for a referendum to repeal an existing state law; (2) the legislature can voluntarily
refer legislative acts to the voters for their approval; or (3) the state constitution can require
that certain legislation be submitted to the voters. Id. Presently, 37 states provide for one or
more of the referendum procedures. Id. at 66-67.
21. See R. LUCE, LEOISLATIVE PRINCIPLES 572-74 (1930). In 1897, municipalities in Nebraska
were given the opportunity to use the initiative in local affairs, and, shortly thereafter, South
Dakota became the first state to enact a statewide initiative procedure. Id. at 573. Most of
the states which currently have initiative provisions for state legislation adopted these provi-
sions by 1918. See Ranney, The United States of America, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 70 (D. Butler & A. Ranney eds. 1978). Since 1918, only
two states have given their citizens the power to initiate legislation-Alaska in 1959 and Wyoming
in 1968. Id.
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In recent years, the initiative has undergone renewed popularity as a legislative
tool"2 and has generated a great deal' of discussion among legal
commentators.23 Although the constitutionality of initiatives once was
questioned, 2' modern courts accept them as an appropriate lawmaking
method. 5 When laws enacted by popular vote are subjected to judicial review,
22. In the November 1978 general election alone, nearly 200 initiatives and referendums
appeared on ballots in 38 states. Beck, Issues, Issues, Issues, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 1978, at
53. Many of these measures were proposals to cut taxes or to limit government spending, the
results of a "taxpayers revolt" spurred by the enactment of a tax reduction proposition in
California. See Comment, Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 WASH. L.
REV. 175, 180 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Judicial Review].
23. Much of the discussion has centered on the alleged dangers of bypassing the legislative
system. Critics of direct legislation express concern that minority interests are not sufficiently
protected and that the initiative process lacks the characteristics of careful deliberation and
compromise that a representative legislature possesses. See Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's
Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1979); Gunn, Initiatives and Referendums:
Direct Democracy and Minority Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN. 135 (1981); Olson, Litigation Ap-
proaches: The Local Power of Referendum in Federal and State Courts--A Michigan Model,
50 J. URB. L. 209, (1972); Saeger, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1978); Note, The Califor-
nia Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 922 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Note, California Initiative Process]. Supporters of initiatives respond that the purpose
of initiatives is to serve as an additional check on legislatures that are biased toward special
interest groups, and that there is no strong evidence that a representative system is more pro-
tective of minority rights than is direct voting. See Allen, The National Initiative Proposal:
A Preliminary Analysis, 58 NEB. L. REV. 965 (1979); Note, Zoning and the Referendum: Con-
verging Powers, Conflicting Processes, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 97, 109-10 (1977).
Supporters of the initiative process also argue that initiatives actually allow minority issues
to be raised and heard, and that ballot issues proposed by the public strengthen the democratic
system by encouraging public debate and interest in new ideas. See Grossman, The Initiative
and Referendum Process: The Michigan Experience, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 77, 80 (1981). For
an early and generally positive analysis of the initiative process, see J. BARNETT, THE OPERA-
TION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL IN OREGON (1915). A number of recent books
and articles have provided excellent summaries of the arguments for and against initiatives
and referendums. See REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 23-37
(D. Butler & A. Ranney eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as REFERENDUMS]; Sirico, The Constitu-
tionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REV. 637, 639-41 (1980); Note, In-
itiative and Referendum, supra note 18, at 937-42.
24. See Note, Constitutional Constraints on Initiative and Referendum, 32 VAND. L. REV.
1143, 1147-48 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutional Constraints]. When the use of
initiatives first became popular, critics of the initiative process often cited the guaranty clause
as a basis for challenging its constitutionality. Id. at 1147-48. The guaranty clause states in
part, "The United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government .. " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The critics charged that the initiative process
violated article IV because it denied the states a republican form of government. Note, Con-
stitutional Constraints, supra, at 1147-48. In Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223
U.S. 118 (1912), the Supreme Court refused to pass judgment on the constitutionality of adopt-
ing a statute by initiative, holding that the question was political in nature and, thus, beyond
its jurisdiction. Id. at 150-51. In Kiernan v. City of Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912), the Court
applied the political question doctrine to initiatives at the municipal level as well. Id. at 164.
25. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1975) (initiatives
are a "basic instrument of democratic government"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 32:901
they are held to the same constitutional standard as laws passed by a
legislative body.26
In addition to providing a means of enacting binding laws, ballot pro-
positions also serve as vehicles for measuring public opinion."1 Initiatives
or referendums used in this manner have no binding effect; rather, they are
designed to advise government officials of public sentiment on particular
issues.28 A number of states and the District of Columbia have specific
statutes that permit legislative bodies or citizens to submit advisory ques-
tions on public policy to the electorate. 9 A specific law providing for ad-
visory questions, however, is not necessarily a prerequisite to placing non-
binding ballot propositions on state or local ballots. Attempts have been
made to place advisory questions on the ballot through initiative statutes
that did not specifically provide for nonbinding questions." Many of these
(1971) (initiatives and referendums are a demonstration of "devotion to democracy"); see also
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 693 (1975) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I
have no doubt about the validity of the initiative or the referendum as an appropriate method
of deciding questions of community policy.").
26. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967). Some commentators have suggested that because direct legislation presents a strong
potential for abuse of minority interests, courts should employ a more heightened scrutiny when
reviewing laws enacted by initiative. See Comment, Judicial Review, supra note 22, at 200-09;
Note, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 24, at 1165-66.
27. See Comment, The Local Initiative-A Proper Sounding Board for National Issues?,
1968 UTAH L. REV. 464 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Local Initiative]; Note, Farley v. Healey:
The Use of the Municipal Initiative as a Poll-Taking Device on Non-Municipal Issues, 5 CAL.
W.L. REV. 148 (1968); Note, Vietnam Peace Petitions-Questions of American Policy in Viet-
nam Permitted on Local Election Ballot, 3 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Vietnam Peace Petitions].
28. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 28-6 (1981).
29. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 5353 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) (local legislative bodies
may hold advisory elections to allow voters to voice their opinions on substantive issues); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-146 (Supp. VII 1980) (district council may call special election to present any
proposition for advisory vote of people); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 28-6 (1981) (voters can
place an advisory public question on state or local ballot); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 53,
§§ 18A, 19 (West 1975 & Supp. 1982-83) (advisory questions can be placed on local ballots
by vote of city council or by citizen petition); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714 (1978) (voters can
request by petition that proposed amendment to the United States Constitution be submitted
to electorate for an advisory opinion); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:37-1 (1964 & Supp. 1982-83) (govern-
ing body of any municipality or county can place on ballot advisory question pertaining to
local government or local affairs); Id. § 19:37-1.1 (Supp. 1982-83) (voters may place advisory
question on local ballot only if it relates to advisory question submitted to voters by a govern-
mental body); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-30(16) (Law. Co-op. 1977) (county governments may
conduct advisory referenda); Wis. STAT. § 59.07(67) (1981) (county boards may conduct coun-
tywide advisory referendums).
30. See Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal. 2d 325, 431 P.2d 650, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1967); Carr
v. Harnett, No. 289487 (Super. Ct. of Middlesex County, Mass. Nov. 6, 1967) (discussed in
Note, Vietnam Peace Petitions, supra note 27, at 183); Silberman v. Katz, 54 Misc. 2d 956,
283 N.Y.S.2d 895, aff'd, 28 A.D.2d 992, 284 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1967); State ex rel. Rhodes v.
Board of Elections, 12 Ohio St. 2d 4, 230 N.E.2d 347 (1967).
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attempts have been successful, but they have not gone unchallenged. 3'
Most of these challenges arose in the late 1960's as a result of efforts
to place Vietnam peace proposals on municipal ballots.32 In Farley v.
Healey,3" the California Supreme Court upheld the right of an antiwar group
to place on the San Francisco city ballot an initiative urging an immediate
cease-fire and withdrawal of United States military forces from Vietnam.
Relying on the broad language of the initiative statute,3" and on the fact
that the board of supervisors and the city council often made declarations
on policy matters beyond their legislative control, the Farley court rejected
arguments that the only initiatives which could be placed on local ballots
were measures that concerned municipal affairs." According to the court,
the only limitation on the ability of citizens to place advisory questions on
the ballot was the requirement of a petition signed by a certain number of
registered voters.36
In Ohio, however, the state supreme court prevented a Vietnam peace pro-
posal from appearing on a municipal ballot by holding that the initiative
petition did not present any issue which the municipality was authorized to
control by legislative action.37 A New York court similarly blocked an at-
tempt to place a Vietnam-related question on a local ballot in Silberman
v. Katz.38 In that case, an antiwar group attempted to place on the New
York City ballot an initiative asking voters whether a new municipal office
known as the Anti Vietnam War Coordinator should be created.39 The group
relied on a city charter provision that permitted initiatives to establish new
city offices. ° The Silberman court, however, noting that the office would
be devoid of power, refused to allow the initiative on the ballot. ' In the
court's view, the group's true intention was to place an advisory question
on the ballot, a measure that specifically was proscribed by New York law."'
31. See, e.g., Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal. 2d 325, 431 P.2d 650, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1967)
(election board refusal to place Vietnam peace proposal on ballot).
32. See cases cited supra note 30.
33. 67 Cal. 2d 325, 431 P.2d 650, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1967).
34. The statute gave registered voters the power to initiate "any ordinance, act or other
measure which is within the power conferred upon the board of supervisors to enact ... "
Id. at 328, 431 P.2d at 652, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 28. In addition, the statute stated that "any
declaration of policy may be submitted to the electors .... I d.
35. Id. at 328-29, 431 P.2d at 652-53, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29. The court noted that the
San Francisco Board of Supervisors recently had passed a resolution praising President Johnson
for his stand on the 1967 Middle East War. Id.
36. Id. at 328, 431 P.2d at 652, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 28. At about the same time Farley was
decided, a Massachusetts superior court upheld the right of an antiwar group to include a
Vietnam peace proposal on the Cambridge, Massachusetts, ballot. See Note, Vietnam Peace
Petitions, supra note 27, at 183-84.
37. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Board of Elections, 12 Ohio St. 2d 4, 230 N.E.2d 347 (1967).
38. 54 Misc. 2d 956, 283 N.Y.S.2d 895, aff'd, 28 A.D.2d 992, 284 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1967).
39. Id. at 957, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 963, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
42. Id. at 959, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
1983]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 32:901
Thus, the Vietnam War initiative cases appear to indicate that advisory ques-
tions can be placed on the ballot when a statute specifically provides for
advisory questions 3 or when an initiative statute permits a flexible construc-
tion that would provide for advisory questions.4 4
Notwithstanding legal challenges, most state ballot access laws make it
difficult for private citizens to submit propositions to the voters. 5 In states
that provide for initiatives, citizens who wish to place a proposition on the
ballot must convince a certain number of registered voters to sign a petition.4 6
Placing a legislative initiative on a statewide ballot usually requires the
signatures of a certain number of qualified voters, generally between one
and five percent of the total votes cast in the last election for governor.4 1
43. Once a statute allows citizen-sponsored advisory questions on the ballot, nearly any
subject matter can be covered by a question. For example, in Thompson v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 265 Mass. 16, 163 N.E. 192 (1928), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
refused to hear a challenge to the inclusion on a local ballot of an advisory question regarding
the repeal of prohibition. Under a Massachusetts law that remains in effect today, an advisory
question can be placed on state legislative district ballots subject to a determination by the
state attorney general that the question is one of public policy. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
53, § 19 (West 1975). The plaintiffs in Thompson claimed that the advisory question on the
prohibition amendment was not a question of public policy for Massachusetts within the mean-
ing of the statute. 265 Mass. at 17, 163 N.E. at 192. The court, however, held that the at-
torney general's determination that the measure should appear on the ballot should not be
disturbed absent a finding that the attorney general acted in bad faith. Id. at 19, 163 N.E. at 193.
44. Compare Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal. 2d 325, 431 P.2d 650, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1967) (city
charter allows any declaration of policy to be submitted to voters) and Carr v. Harnett, No.
289487 (Super. Ct. of Middlesex County, Mass. Nov. 6, 1967) (statute allows ballot proposi-
tions that request city council to pass an ordinance, resolution, order, or vote) with Silberman
v. Katz, 54 Misc. 2d 956, 283 N.Y.S.2d 895, aff'd, 28 A.D.2d 992, 284 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1967)
(statute proscribes advisory ballot questions) and State ex rel. Rhodes v. Board of Elections,
12 Ohio St. 2d 4, 230 N.E.2d 347 (1967) (constitution limits local initiative powers to citizens
only on questions which municipalities may be authorized by law to control by legislative action).
In addition to the Vietnam War initiative cases, there are records of other attempts to place
advisory questions on ballots in states that did not have specific provisions for nonbinding
propositions. In a 1928 advisory opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a pro-
posed statewide initiative measure concerning the repeal of prohibition was unconstitutional.
Opinion of the Justices, 262 Mass. 603, 163 N.E. 439 (1928). The measure asked voters whether
the state's congressmen should be requested to support the repeal of prohibition. Id. at 605,
163 N.E. at 440. The court held that the question was not a "law" or a "measure" as required
of statewide initiatives. Id. at 607, 163 N.E. at 440. Similarly, a New York appellate court
held that a referendum providing for the appointment of a committee to study and report
on the possibility of providing off-track betting in the state was actually an advisory question
on the off-track betting issue and, consequently, was unauthorized by state law. Kupferman
v. Katz, 19 A.D.2d 824, 243 N.Y.S.2d 773, aff'd on other grounds, 13 N.Y.2d 932, 194 N.E.2d
47, 244 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1963). The court allowed the measure to remain on the ballot, however,
because the challenge to its validity did not occur until well after the machinery and expen-
ditures for conducting the proposition had gone forward. Id.
45. See Sirico, supra note 23, at 659-63.
46. See Note, Initiative and Referendum, supra note 18, at 930-32. For a list of the signature
requirements in each state for constitutional and statutory initiatives, see id. at 928-29 (table I).
47. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 8 (5%); MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 9 (8%); ORE. CONST.
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The typical signature requirements for placing an initiative on a municipal
or county ballot range from ten to fifteen percent of registered voters in
the jurisdiction where the measure is to be placed on the ballot." Some states,
however, have required signatures of as many as twenty-five percent of all
registered voters to place an initiative on a local ballot."9
One of the major rationales for a signature requirement is to ensure that
only serious initiatives with more than a modicum of popular support will
appear on the election ballot.5" Proponents of an initiative must support
it strongly enough to be willing to expend the significant amount of time,
energy, and financial resources necessary to collect the required number of
signatures.5' There also must be a substantial number of registered voters
who are willing to sign their names to a petition to place an initiative on
the ballot.52 Signature requirements, therefore, guard against frivolous in-
itiatives that would serve only to crowd the ballot and confuse the voters."
Candidate Ballot Access
There have been few federal constitutional challenges to state ballot ac-
cess laws restricting initiatives." The vast majority of legal challenges to
burdensome ballot access requirements have concerned restrictions on
candidacy." Most of these challenges have been brought by independent and
minor party candidates who have charged that laws in certain states effec-
art. IV, § 1(b) (6%); IDAHO CODE § 35-1805 (1981) (10%).
48. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(8) (signatures of 15% of all registered voters
required to place initiative on local ballot); ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § I (same); MAsS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 53, § 18A (West Supp. 1982-83) (petition to place advisory question on municipal
ballot must be signed by 10% of the registered voters in a municipality); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 19:37-1.1 (Supp. 1982-83) (same).
49. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 28-6 (1981) (petition to place advisory questions
on a political subdivision ballot requires signatures of 25% of the political subdivision's registered
voters); N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:69A-184 (1967) (petition to place proposed ordinance on ballot
of municipality of 70,000 or less requires signatures of 25% of municipality's registered voters).
50. See Sirico, supra note 23, at 659-63.
51. Id. The financial cost of placing a measure on the ballot can be especially burdensome.
See Lee, California, in REFERENDUMS, supra note 23, at 101; Note, California Initiative Pro-
cess, supra note 23, at 939-40. In California, for example, $400,000 was spent in a drive to
place a state employees' salary measure on the 1972 ballot, and $436,000 was spent to qualify
a tax limitation measure in 1973. Lee, supra, at 101.
52. A substantial portion of the signatures collected often prove invalid. See N.Y. Times,
Aug. 7, 1979, at Al, col. 1 (of 47,328 signatures collected for a recall petition, only 18,061
were valid). Therefore, in order to ensure a place on the ballot, proponents of an initiative
must gather significantly more signatures than the minimum required. This necessitates a well-
organized campaign consisting of a substantial number of people. See Lee, supra note 51, at 101.
53. See Sirico, supra note 23, at 660.
54. See supra note 9.
55. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983) Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S.
957 (1982); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979);
American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Richards
v. Lavelle, 620 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1980); Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973).
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tively prevented their names from appearing on election ballots. 6 Although
modern Supreme Court analysis of ballot access restrictions has been poorly
defined and inconsistent, 5" it is clear that laws are unconstitutional if they
make ballot access virtually impossible for candidates or political parties that
demonstrate substantial popular support. 8
In Williams v. Rhodes," the 1968 landmark decision in the ballot access
field, the Court invalidated an Ohio statutory scheme that effectively kept
third parties off state election ballots.6" Applying a fourteenth amendment
equal protection analysis, 6' the Court held that the ballot restrictions im-
paired the fundamental rights of voting and association. 2 The Williams Court
observed that the right to vote is effectively burdened if a voter must cast
his ballot for only one of two parties when other parties are "clamoring
56. Ballot access restrictions that have been challenged successfully include burdensome petition
requirements, see, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (statutory requirement that
new party collect signatures of 15% of the electorate to be placed on ballot was too high);
filing fees, see, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (filing fee requirements for indigent
candidates violate first and fourteenth amendments); early filing deadlines, see, e.g., Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983) (early filing deadline for independent candidates violates
voting and associational rights); and disaffiliation requirements, see, e.g., Anderson v. Babb,
632 F.2d 300, 305-06 n.2 (4th Cir. 1980) (state interest in requiring independent candidates
to disaffiliate themselves from political parties at early date is not as great in national elections
as in state elections).
57. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13-20 to 21 (1978).
58. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 25 (1968).
59. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
60. Id. at 35. Prior to Williams, the Court had failed to recognize a constitutionally pro-
tected right of ballot access under the United States Constitution. See Snowden v. Hughes,
321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944) (right to become a candidate for state office is a "right or privilege of
state citizenship, not of national citizenship").
61. In most equal protection cases, the Court requires the state to show that the statutory
classification is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative purpose. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (test is whether differential treatment is so unrelated to achievement
of legislative purpose that court can only conclude that legislature's actions were irrational);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (test is whether any state of facts may
be reasonably conceived to justify classification). However, when a classification affects a suspect
class, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1967) (racial classifications), or a fundamen-
tal interest, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting), strict scrutiny
review is "triggered." See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 671
(1980). To survive a strict scrutiny analysis, the classification must be narrowly drawn and
must serve a compelling state interest. Id. In recent years, the Court has moved away from
this rigid two-tiered approach. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("intermediate
scrutiny" used to analyze gender-based classifications). The ballot access cases exemplify this
departure from the old equal protection analysis. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
62. 393 U.S. at 34. In order to obtain ballot access in Ohio, a third party was required
to obtain signatures of registered voters equal to 15% of the number of votes cast in the last
gubernatorial election. Id. at 36 (Douglas, J., concurring). The third party also had to create
an elaborate party structure and conduct primary elections. Id. at 36-37 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). The two major parties, on the other hand, could remain on the ballot simply by receiv-
ing 10% of the votes in the last gubernatorial election. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
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for a place on the ballot." 3 Similarly, the Court recognized that the right
to associate by forming a new political party means little if that party is
prevented from gaining access to the election ballot."
In subsequent ballot access decisions, the Court has continued to emphasize
fourteenth amendment standards. 5 The digree of scrutiny employed in these
cases generally has been determined by the importance of the state interests
protected by such restrictions and the extent to which they burden ballot
access.66 The Court has recognized legitimate state interests in avoiding over-
crowded ballots and in restricting the ballot to serious candidates. 67 Yet,
at the same time, the Court has noted that restricting ballot access to achieve
voting rationality may conflict with another important goal: expanding
political opportunity.68 Although the Court never has held candidacy to be
a fundamental right,'  a number of decisions have emphasized the impor-
tance of ensuring that candidates are elected in a "free and unimpaired
fashion." 7 Furthermore, the Court has observed that a ballot access restric-
63. Id. at 31.
64. Id.
65. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
66. See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (Court engaged in extremely deferential
standard of review after concluding there was de minimus burden on candidate access); see
also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (Court used strict scrutiny after finding ballot
access to be foreclosed completely to third parties).
67. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982); Illinois State l3d. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1979); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732-33
(1974). Overcrowded ballots have been thought to create voter confusion and discourage voter
participation. See Elder, Access to the Ballot By Political Candidates, 83 DICK. L. REV. 387,
389-90 (1979). This notion has its origin in the short-ballot movement of the early twentieth
century. Id. Those who advocated the "short-ballot principle" believed that only important
offices should be elective and that few offices should be filled by election at any one time.
Id. at 389 (citing R. CHILDS, THE SHORT-BALLOT PRINCIPLES 170 (1911)). In the reformers'
view, long ballots resulted in voter confusion, thereby preventing an intelligent exercise of the
franchise. Id. Over a period of time, the emphasis on the short-ballot concept shifted from
the state interest in restricting the number of elective offices appearing on the ballot, to an
interest in restricting the number of candidates appearing on the ballot for each office. Id.
at 390. In Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974), for example, the Court expressed concern
that allowing the names of frivolous or insincere candidates to appear on the ballot would
unduly lengthen the ballot and, hence, discourage voter participation and confuse those who
do participate. Id. at 715.
68. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1572 (1983); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S.
709, 713 (1974).
69. A number of lower federal courts, however, have held that the right to run for public
office is a fundamental right. See, e.g., Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 189 (1st Cir. 1973)
(running for office is a fundamental right protected by the first amendment); Duncantell v.
Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (same).
70. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336 (1972) (citizens have a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on
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tion may exclude certain classes of candidates from the electoral process. 7
As a result, political participation by the supporters of those candidates may
be sharply limited."2 In its most recent ballot access case, Anderson v.
Celebrezze,73 the Court noted that "it is especially difficult for the state to
justify a restriction that limits a political group whose members share a par-
ticular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status."" Thus, while
the Court has recognized that unduly lengthy ballots threaten the integrity
of the electoral system, it nevertheless has invalidated restrictions that pre-
vent reasonably diligent persons from obtaining ballot access."
Although the Court has often relied on an equal protection analysis in
its ballot access decisions, the first amendment has provided the essential
foundation for most decisions invalidating burdensome ballot access
restrictions.76 The right to engage in association for the advancement of
political beliefs and ideas has long been held to be a first amendment
interest. 7 The Court consistently has recognized that this right may be im-
an equal basis); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (other rights become illusory if
the right to vote is undermined).
71. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983) (early filing deadlines exclude
late-emerging independent presidential candidates from state ballot); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S.
709 (1974) (filing fees deny indigent candidates the right to appear on ballot); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (burdensome petition requirements prevent ballot access for third
party candidates).
72. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1571-72 (1983) (early filing deadlines
for independent presidential candidates limit political participation of those dissatisfied with
the choices presented by the two major parties); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972)
(filing fee requirement burdens less affluent people whose favorite candidates may be unwilling
to pay large fees.)
73. 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983).
74. Id. at 1572.
75. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979);
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
76. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). A number of commentators have suggested that a much more
straightforward approach to ballot access cases is to rely on the first amendment directly. See
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 41-43 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Elder, supra note 67,
at 403; Rada, Cardwell & Friedman, Access to the Ballot, 13 URB. L. 793, 805-06 (1981);
Note, The Constitutional Limitations Upon State Regulation of its Ballot-Williams v. Rhodes,
30 OHIO ST. L.J. 202, 207-08 (1969). Indeed, the Court in Anderson v. Celebrezze abandoned
an equal protection analysis and based its decision directly on the first amendment and the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1569 n.7 (1983).
77. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Writing for the Court,
Justice Harlan stated:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association. . . . It is beyond debate that
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideals is an
inseparable aspect of the "liberty" insured by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.
Id. at 460 (citations omitted); see also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973) (right of
association is a basic constitutional freedom); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960)
(right of association lies at the foundation of a free society).
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paired by onerous ballot access requirements." In addition, the Court's ballot
access decisions indicate that the right to vote also has first amendment im-
plications.79 Unjustifiable ballot restrictions limit an important method of
expressing political preferences: casting a vote for the candidate of one's
choice." Finally, the Court has recognized that the ability of candidates and
political parties to express their ideas effectively is dependent upon ballot
access." In Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,2
the Court noted that "an election campaign is a means of disseminating
ideas as well as attaining political office. Overbroad restrictions on ballot
access jeopardize this form of political expression." 83
The First Amendment and the Right to a Public Forum
The Court's invalidation of burdensome ballot access restrictions is con-
sistent with a long line of decisions that has extended first amendment pro-
tection to various modes of expression. 4 Activities such as spending money
to advocate either a candidate" or referendum,86 engaging in litigation, 7
canvassing door-to-door,88 wearing a black armband,89 and picketing in front
of a school9" have been afforded first amendment protection. Implicit in
each of these decisions is the recognition that the right to freedom of ex-
pression includes not only the right to be free from censorship, but also
the right to use an effective means of communication.' As one commen-
tator noted, each mode of communication possesses unique characteristics
78. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1568-69 (1983); Illinois State Bd. of Elec-
tions v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709,
716 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
79. See cases cited supra note 78; see also Elder, supra note 67, at 402 (voting is the most
common means of political expression in our mass society); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term,
83 HARV. L. REV. 60, 95 (1969) (Court has interpreted right to vote effectively to protect a
full range of self-expression); cf. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (right to vote derives from the right of association that is at the core of the first
amendment).
80. See cases cited supra note 78.
81. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1572-73 (1983); Illinois State Bd. of Elec-
tions v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
82. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
83. Id. at 186; see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1572 (1983) (ballot access
restrictions "reduce diversity and competition in the marketplace of ideas").
84. See Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233.
85. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
86. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
87. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
88. See Schaumburg v. Citizens For a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
89. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
90. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972).
91. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 193-94 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 305-06 (1970);
Stone, supra note 84, at 256.
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and advantages, and each contributes to the "robust exchange of ideas." 92
The Court also has acknowledged that in order to enhance the effective
exercise of first amendment rights, appropriate forums must be made available
for people to express their ideas freely.93 Initially, the public forum doctrine'4
was invoked by the Court to ensure minimum access for speech in areas
traditionally associated with first amendment activities, such as streets and
parks. 5 Speech activities in these forums are subject only to narrow regula-
tions affecting their time, place, and manner.96 The fact that other forums
might be available does not justify prohibiting the exercise of first amend-
ment rights in a public forum. 7
92. Stone, supra note 84, at 256-57.
93. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (peaceful demonstra-
tions in public places protected by first amendment); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147, 152 (1969) (marching and picketing on streets and highways protected by first amend-
ment); Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968) (the
exercise of first amendment rights in public places cannot be "denied broadly and absolutely");
Cox v. New Hampshire, 321 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (speech-related uses of public places cannot
be banned); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (same); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 515-16 (1939) (same).
94. The term public forum was used first in a 1946 California Supreme Court opinion.
See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 546, 171 P.2d 885, 892-93
(1946). The contemporary use of the term, however, is based on a definition provided by Pro-
fessor Kalven approximately 20 years ago. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1. According to Professor Kalven, "the streets, the
parks, and other public places are an important facility for public discussion and political pro-
cess. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can commandeer. ... Id. at 11-12.
For further discussion of the public forum doctrine, see L. TRIBE, supra note 57, at §§ 12-20
to 22; Horning, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931 (discuss-
ing the constitutional underpinnings of the public forum doctrine); Stone, supra note 84 (ex-
amining the evolution of the public forum doctrine); Note, Public Forum: Minimum Access,
Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975) (comparing the "minimum
access" and "equal access" views of the public forum doctrine).
95. See, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (denial of permit to give speech
in park for no apparent reason violates first amendment); Saia v. City of New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948) (city ordinance banning use of loudspeakers in public places violates first amend-
ment); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ordinance forbidding door-to-door canvassing
denies freedom of speech); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (ordinance prohibiting distribu-
tion of handbills on city streets violates first amendment); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (ordinances forbidding or regulating distribution of literature in streets violate freedom
of speech and press); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (right to assemble peacefully, to
speak, and to distribute literature on city streets is protected by first amendment).
96. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (law requiring license
to demonstrate on city streets must provide narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide
licensing authority); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951) (public officials cannot
be given authority to limit exercise of first amendment freedoms in public places upon criteria
unrelated to proper regulation of such places); Saia v. City of New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560
(1948) (ordinances regulating use of loudspeakers in public places must be narrowly drawn);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (only time, place, and manner of speech
in public places should be regulated).
97. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("one is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place").
1983] GEORGES v. CARNEY 915
In the 1960's and 1970's, the public forum concept was expanded beyond
the streets and parks. Government-owned facilities such as schools98 and
libraries99 were given public forum status.'00 In addition, the Court recognized
that the government can create a public forum where none previously ex-
isted simply by opening a forum to the public for the expression of ideas.' 0 '
Speech in these forums is entitled to the same procedural safeguards as speech
in streets and parks.'°2 Consequently, regulations are forbidden if they create
a possibility of government censorship based on the content of the message
expressed in government-created public forums.' 3 The Court has empha-
sized, however, that the manner of expression must be compatible with the
normal activity of these forums."'0
One of the rationales for ensuring minimal access to public forums is based
on the belief that the "widest possible dissemination of information from
98. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
99. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (plurality opinion).
100. Lower federal courts also have found public forums to exist in a number of other govern-
mental facilities. See, e.g., Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921
(7th Cir.) (airport terminal), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Albany Welfare Rights Org.
v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.) (welfare office waiting room), cert denied sub nom. Lavine
v. Albany Welfare Rights Org., 419 U.S. 838 (1974); Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392
F.2d 83 (2d Cir.) (port authority), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Reilly v. Noel, 384 F.
Supp. 741 (D.R.I. 1974) (courthouse rotunda).
101. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174-76 (1976) (school board meeting open to public becomes a public
forum); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1976) (municipal
auditoriums dedicated to expressive activities become public forums).
102. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 176 (1976) (when holding public meetings, school board cannot
discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment or the content of their speech);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1975) (system for choosing
performances for municipal auditorium must contain rigorous procedural safeguards to protect
first amendment rights); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) (regulation
of demonstrations on school grounds must be narrowly tailored to further state's legitimate
interest).
103. See cases cited supra note 102.
104. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court, succinctly explained the rule:
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of
regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable." Although a silent vigil
may not unduly interfere with a public library, making a speech in the reading
room almost certainly would. That same speech should be perfectly appropriate
in a park. The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969)
(student may express his opinions in school if he does so without substantially interfering with
appropriate school discipline requirements). In a number of cases, the Court has found a public
forum not to exist on some types of government-owned property because the particular exer-
cise of first amendment rights was incompatible with the normal activity of the property. See,
e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (political rally at military facility); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966) (demonstration on jailhouse grounds).
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diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."' '"
By affording all people and all points of view access to public forums, the
Court helps to maintain an open marketplace of ideas.01 6 Many members
of the Court have noted that public forums provide an opportunity to exer-
cise first amendment rights to those who cannot afford access to the mass
media. 107
There have been a few cases in which the Court has upheld government
regulations that restricted certain messages while permitting others.'0 8 In
neither of these cases, however, was a public forum found to exist. In Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, "09 for example, the Court upheld a city transit
system policy that permitted commercial advertising on its buses but banned
105. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. I, 4 (1949) (vitality of civil and political institutions depends on free discussion);
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (free political discussion ensures that govern-
ment will be responsive to the will of the people and that peaceful change will be effected).
106. See Stone, supra note 84, at 233-35. One of the most effective judicial proponents of
the "marketplace of ideas" concept was Justice Holmes. See Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). According to Justice Holmes, unfettered speech assists
the advancement of knowledge and society's search for truth. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J. dissent-
ing). In Holmes's view, the best method for achieving the "ultimate good desired" is to sub-
ject as many ideas as possible to the competition of the public marketplace. Id. (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Although the marketplace theory has been criticized by a number of scholars, see,
e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-1, at 576-77 (marketplace of ideas argument for freedom
of speech "relies too dangerously on metaphor for a theory that purports to be more hard-
headed than literary"); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 964 (1978) (marketplace theory rests on a series of false assumptions), it nevertheless
has provided the basis for a great many first amendment decisions. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (we depend for the correction of pernicious opinions
"on the competition of other ideas"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) (purpose of first amendment is to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth ultimately will prevail); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (right
conclusions are more likely gathered out of a "multitude of tongues").
Closely related to the marketplace of ideas concept is Professor Alexander Meiklejohn's theory
that in order to govern effectively, people must be exposed to a wide range of ideas. See A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). Professor Meikle-
john limited the absolute protection afforded by the first amendment to "political speech,"
but his definition of political speech was extremely broad, encompassing literature, theatre,
and art. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 256-57.
107. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 144 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (door-to-door hand delivery of messages is method
of written expression most accessible to those who are not powerful, established, or well financed);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) (many people who wish
to disseminate ideas cannot afford to own or control communications media); Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door-to-door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly
financed causes of the little people."); see also Horning, supra note 94, 938-39 (poor and
unrepresented provided with a means of communication by the right to a public forum); Kalven,
supra note 94, at 30 (allowing the poor and underprivileged a means of communication con-
tributes to the robust exchange of ideas).
108. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114
(1981); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
109. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
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political and public-issue advertising. A plurality of the Court concluded that
the city was not operating a public forum when it allowed commercial adver-
tising on its buses; rather, it merely was engaging in commerce. 1 ° Similarly,
in United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Associations," the Court
upheld a postal regulation barring people from depositing circulars and other
messages in letterboxes without affixing postage. The Court found that let-
terboxes were not transformed into public forums merely because the United
States mail was deposited in them." 2
The question of what is or what can be a public forum has often vexed
the Court. Streets, parks, and government buildings open to the public clearly
are public forums." 3 It is perhaps less obvious that election ballots and other
mediums of expression should be considered public forums. Nevertheless,
in light of the Supreme Court's policy of extending first amendment protec-
tion to various modes of expression,' it is not surprising that the Seventh
Circuit in Georges v. Carney suggested that an election ballot could be used
as a public forum." '
110. Id. at 303. Justice Douglas provided the fifth vote for the majority but based his deci-
sion on a captive audience rationale. Id. at 305-08 (Douglas, J., concurring). In Justice Douglas's
opinion, the commuters' right to be free from "forced intrusions on their privacy" by political
advertising precluded the city from transforming its buses into public forums. Id. at 307 (Douglas,
J., concurring). The dissent argued that by accepting commercial advertising on its transit system,
the city voluntarily had created a public forum. Id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Conse-
quently, the dissent concluded that the ban on political advertising amounted to content-based
discrimination in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 319-20.
The Lehman Court's conclusion that the city was not required to accept political advertising
on its buses also has been criticized by many commentators. See, e.g., Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 21-22 (1975) (Lehman Court
failed to consider first amendment equality principle); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv.
L. REV. 41, 153 (1974) (by permitting some advertising, transit system could not claim that
political advertising would interfere with providing transportation). One commentator has noted
that at the time Lehman was decided, commercial speech was not regarded as expression pro-
tected by the first amendment. See Note, Access to State-Owned Communications Media-The
Public Forum Doctrine, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1410, 1418 n.29 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Access to Media]. Thus, the transit system was not providing a forum for speech when it per-
mitted commercial advertising to be displayed because at that time, commercial advertising
was not considered speech for purposes of first amendment analysis. Id. Commercial speech
was not extended full first amendment protection until approximately two years after the Lehman
opinion was written. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Ill. 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
112. Id. at 128. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White asserted that the mails and letter-
boxes were public forums because of their use as vehicles for communicating information and
ideas. See id. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 141 (White, J., concurring). Never-
theless, Justice Brennan, believing that a postage requirement was a valid time, place, and
manner restriction, concurred in the judgment. Id. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
White concurred because he viewed the postage requirement as a valid users fee which the
government properly could charge for the use of the mails. Id. at 141-42 (White, J., concurring).
113. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
115. Georges v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Factual Background
In May 1982, a private citizens group, the DuPage County Citizens for
a Nuclear Arms Freeze, began an effort to collect the signatures necessary
to place an advisory question on the DuPage County, Illinois, election
ballot. ' 6 The question which was to be submitted to DuPage County voters
in the November 1982 general election asked whether the people of the
county should "endorse the call to halt the nuclear arms race" and request
municipal, county, state, and federal governments to adopt a "freeze on
all further testing, production, and deployment" of Soviet and American
nuclear weapons.' To coordinate their ballot access efforts, the nuclear arms
freeze group hired Wendy Georges, a professional political organizer with
experience in petition drives.'"
Under Illinois law, advisory questions may be placed on the ballot by
citizen-initiated petitions.'" To have an advisory question placed on the ballot
in a local political subdivision-such as a county, municipality, or school
district-citizens must collect the signatures of twenty-five percent of the
registered voters in the subdivision.' On the other hand, public bodies-
such as county boards, city councils, or school boards-need only adopt
a resolution or ordinance to submit an advisory question to the voters.' 2'
Illinois law additionally provides that no more than three questions, binding
or advisory, may be placed on the ballot in the same election.' 22 It further
provides that if more than three questions are submitted, only the first three
will appear on the ballot.' 23
The Citizens for a Nuclear Arms Freeze needed to collect the signatures
of 75,000 DuPage County voters in order to place its question on the county
ballot.'24 No group in DuPage County had ever been able to satisfy this
116. Brief for Appellant at 7, Georges v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1982).
117. Georges v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297, 299 (7th Cir. 1982). The full question stated:
Whereas one of the greatest challenges facing the people of the earth is to prevent
the occurrence of nuclear war by accident or design, shall the people of the County
of DuPage endorse the call to halt the nuclear arms race and request the DuPage
County Board, in addition to our municipal governments, state legislature and the
U.S. Congress and Senate, to adopt an immediate, mutual, and verifiable freeze
of all further testing, production and deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles,
and designed delivery systems by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. governments, followed
by reductions of present nuclear weapons?
Georges v. Carney, 546 F. Supp. 469, 472 (N.D. 111. 1982).
118. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Georges v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1982).
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 28-1, 6 (Supp. 1982).
120. Id. § 28-6. The signatures of 10% of the state's registered voters are required to place
a citizen-sponsored advisory question on the statewide ballot. Id. § 28-9.
121. Id. § 28-1.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 691 F.2d at 299.
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requirement, and the nuclear arms freeze group was no exception. 25 By the
time the deadline to submit questions to the local election board arrived,
the group had collected only 8,500 signatures.' 26
While the nuclear arms freeze advocates were collecting signatures, the
DuPage County Board submitted four binding questions to appear on the
ballot.' 7 Thus, even if the nuclear arms freeze group had satisfied the,
signature requirement, it still would have been unable to gain access to the
November ballot since the first three questions submitted by the county board
had already filled the spots set aside for ballot propositions in DuPage
County.' 8 Nevertheless, the Citizens for a Nuclear Arms Freeze submitted
their initiative to the DuPage County Board of Elections.
After the board of elections refused to include the nuclear arms freeze
question on the ballot, the freeze advocates filed suit in federal district court
seeking to enjoin the DuPage County election commissioners from prepar-
ing ballots for the November election that did not contain the nuclear arms
freeze question.' 9 Holding the twenty-five percent signature requirement un-
constitutional, the district court concluded that under the Storer v. Brown 3 '
test, the requirement was "so high that a reasonably diligent person could
not be expected to meet it."' 3 ' Nevertheless, the plaintiffs were denied relief
because the district court determined that the three-question limit was ra-
tionally related to the legislature's interests in limiting the length of the ballot
and minimizing voter confusion. 3" In the district court's opinion, the three-
question limit imposed only a minimal burden on the plaintiff's access to
the ballot.' Under Illinois law, the nuclear arms freeze question could have
appeared on the ballot at the next regularly scheduled election if the plain-
125. Id.
126. Id. This was the largest amount ever gathered for this type of a petition drive in DuPage
County. Id.
127. Id. All of the questions involved local issues. Id. One of the questions asked for voter
approval of the issuance of water project bonds. Brief for Appellant at 9, Georges v. Carney,
691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1982). The other three questions involved local property tax matters. Id.
128. 691 F.2d at 299.
129. Georges v. Carney, 546 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The plaintiffs alleged that their
first amendment rights of association and political expression were infringed by the 25% re-
quirement, the three question per ballot limit, and the first-come-first-served method of deciding
which questions were to be included on the ballot. 691 F.2d at 299-300. In addition, the plain-
tiffs asserted that the Illinois statutory scheme violated the equal protection clause because
it was easier for private groups to place certain kinds of binding questions on the ballot than
it was for such groups to place advisory questions on it. Id. The plaintiffs cited Illinois laws
that required only 100 signatures in order to place on the ballot binding proposals to establish
a home for wayward children and a binding proposal for a property tax to support a country
fair. Id. at 300.
130. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
131. 546 F. Supp. at 477 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 742 (1974)).
132. Id. at 478. Subjecting the three-question limit to minimal scrutiny, the district court
held that there was no fundamental right to place an initiative on the ballot. Id. at 476, 478.
133. Id. at 479.
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tiffs had not specifically requested that the question be included on the
November 1982 ballot. 134
The Appellate Court Decision
In a two-to-one decision, the Seventh Circuit upheld the Illinois statutory
scheme.' 35 The rationale employed by the appellate court to reach its deci-
sion differed markedly from the analysis employed in the candidate ballot
access cases. In fact, the court refused even to consider these cases, holding
without elaboration that they involved issues different from those presented
in Georges.'36 Instead, Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court, indicated
that the issue in the case was whether Illinois extended to its citizens the
right to use local ballots as forums for first amendment expression.13'
Judge Posner agreed that the Illinois signature requirement made it "prac-
tically impossible" to put advisory questions on the ballot in political sub-
divisions as populous as DuPage County.'38 Standing alone, however, that
fact did not render the statute unconstitutional. In Judge Posner's view, the
signature requirement was merely a means of keeping all advisory questions
off the ballot.' 39 Since the state is not constitutionally obligated to allow
the ballot to be used as a forum for advocating policy,' Judge Posner opined
that the twenty-five percent requirement withstood first amendment
challenge.'"' According to the court, constitutional problems would arise only
134. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 28-5 (Supp. 1982). The law provides that when more than
three questions are submitted, the extra questions will be the first questions placed on the ballot
at the next regularly scheduled election. Id. If the petition or resolution proposing a question
specifies a particular election for its submission, however, the question cannot be placed on
the ballot in a subsequent election. Id.
135. 691 F.2d at 302.
136. Id. at 300.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 301.
139. The court reasoned that even a 100% requirement would be "lawful for it would be
just an oblique way of keeping all advisory questions off the ballot .. " Id.
140. Id. at 300. The majority rejected arguments that Illinois is required to provide for citizen-
initiated advisory questions simply because it provides for certain citizen-initiated binding ques-
tions. Id. The court reasoned that "by opting for a measure of direct democracy," the state
does not become obligated to allow the ballot to be used as a means of "pure advocacy."
Id. In support of this proposition, the court cited United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (statute banned depositing of messages in mailboxes
without affixing postage), and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (regula-
tions prohibited political advertising on city buses). 691 F.2d at 300-01. The majority noted
that in both of those cases, there was a finding that a public forum did not exist despite the
fact that the alleged forums in question-mailboxes and buses-were in fact vehicles for com-
municating messages. Id. According to the majority, an election ballot is not even a com-
munication vehicle. Id. at 301. Rather, "it is a vehicle only for putting candidates and laws
to the electorate to vote up or down." Id.
141. Id. at 300-01. The court did not address the three-question limit issue except to note
that because the election ballot was not a public forum, it was unnecessary for the court to
decide whether the three-question limit was too low. Id. at 302.
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if governmental bodies began to submit advisory questions." 2 The majority
agreed that if the state or county used the advisory question regulations as
a means of taking sides in the nuclear arms debate, the case would be similar
to Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,'3 a public forum case;'" only
then would prior restraint problems arise. '
Finally, Judge Posner concluded that the Illinois statutory scheme did not
violate the equal protection guarantee. The judge determined that even though
it was easier for governmental bodies to put a question on the ballot than
it was for private groups to do so, the difference was not arbitrary because
resolutions of legislative bodies, unlike those submitted by voters, have a
"presumptive democratic legitimacy."' Similarly, Judge Posner found that
the preference given binding questions over advisory questions was based
on a rational judgment that it is better to allow voters an opportunity to
enact binding legislation than to "provide another soapbox for the advocates
and opponents of great causes.'''
In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Richard Cudahy asserted that the
majority's reasoning "defies common sense."' Judge Cudahy observed that
the Illinois statute specifically provided that citizens should have access to
the ballot for advisory questions.' 9 Thus, acceptance of the majority's argu-
ment, that the state never intended to grant citizens the right to place ad-
visory questions on election ballots, necessarily would ignore "the canon of
statutory interpretation that a statute should be interpreted to give effect
to all its provisions."' 0 The dissenting judge added that even if the major-
ity's interpretation of legislative intent were correct, the court should not
allow the state to create a right that is entirely illusory.'' Although Judge
142. Id. at 301. The majority observed that there was no record of a public body ever plac-
ing an advisory question on the DuPage County ballot. Id.
143. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
144. 691 F.2d at 301. In Southeastern Promotions, the Supreme Court held that a municipal
auditorium, "designed for and dedicated to expressive activities," was a public forum. 420
U.S. at 555 (1975). Consequently, a municipal board's denial of the use of the auditorium,
for the production of a play that the board considered to be obscene, was a prior restraint
of speech and was unconstitutional because there were no procedures to guard against content-
based discrimination. Id. at 561-62.
145. 691 F.2d at 301.
146. Id. at 302.
147. Id. at 302.
148. Id. at 303 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). According to Judge Cudahy, "a state cannot
simultaneously provide an avenue of political expression and burden its use with conditions
that, as the majority concedes, can never be met." Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 304 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
150. Id.. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy wrote:
Though the government may not be required "to create a well informed citizenry"
surely we cannot approve a statutory technique the disingenuousness of which, as
described by the majority, combines an apparent opportunity to speak with a real
commitment to silence. The state has furnished a "soap box" fashioned of paper
mache.
Id. at 304-05 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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Cudahy conceded that the state's objective of preserving the integrity of the
advisory question system was legitimate, he concluded that the method Il-
linois had chosen to achieve this objective-the complete preclusion from
the ballot of all citizen-initiated advisory questions-was "wholly
irrational."' 2
Additionally, Judge Cudahy found the three-question limit to be invalid
as well. In his opinion, the three-question limit, when combined with the
first-come-first-served rule and the ability of local governmental units to pro-
pose binding and advisory questions at will, gave governmental bodies the
power to preempt citizen-sponsored questions." 3 The dissenting judge noted
that once a state provides a forum for the expression of ideas, there must
be adequate procedures to guard against unconstitutional government
censorship." 4
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF GEORGES
In an essentially circular argument, the Georges court concluded that
because the signature requirement was impossible to satisfy, Illinois had not
intended to create a statutory right to place advisory questions on local
ballots."' As the dissenting opinion noted, however, this statutory interpreta-
tion renders meaningless language in the Illinois Election Code"' that ex-
plicitly grants citizens the power to initiate advisory questions."' The ma-
jority offered no evidence of legislative intent to support its interpretation
of the statute. Nor did the state itself argue that the intent of the legislature
was to deny ballot access for citizen-sponsored advisory questions."' Accord-
ing to a number of Supreme Court opinions, the starting point for deter-
mining the legislative intent of a statute is its language, and absent a "clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary, the language must ordinarily be
152. Id. at 304 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
153. Id. The dissent noted that in 1980, the DuPage County Board met one day prior to
the ballot question filing deadline and approved the submission of 11 questions for the November
1980 ballot, thereby preempting five citizen-sponsored property tax reduction questions which
were submitted on the following day. Id. at 303 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 305 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 301.
156. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 28-6 (1981). The statute provides in part:
On a written petition signed by 25% of the registered voters of any incorporated
town, village, city, township, county or school district . .. it shall be the duty
of the proper election officers in each case to submit any question of public policy
so petitioned for, to the electors of such political subdivision .. .at any regular
election named in the petition at which an election is scheduled to be held throughout
such political subdivision. ...
Id.
157. 691 F.2d at 303 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
158. Instead, the state argued that the purpose of the 25% requirement was to exclude those
questions which did not demonstrate sufficient community support to warrant their inclusion
on the ballot. See Brief for Intervenor at 42, Georges v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1982).
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regarded as conclusive."' If the Georges court had followed these guidelines,
it would have reached the inescapable conclusion that Illinois had in fact
created a right to include citizen-sponsored advisory questions on local
ballots. '6
Most courts agree that the right to place a question on the ballot is not
fundamental.' 6 ' Nevertheless, once a state confers this right, it must furnish
procedures that do not burden the constitutional rights of those who wish
to initiate a ballot question.' 62 The nature and extent of these constitutional
rights and the type of procedures that must be provided can be determined
best by referring to the Supreme Court's ballot access ' and public forum
cases. I6
The vast majority of cases addressing ballot access restrictions involve can-
didates for office.' 6 Yet the Seventh Circuit declared, without explanation,
that those cases were inapplicable to the issues presented in Georges.'66 In
doing so, the court failed to recognize that the Illinois advisory question
restrictions implicated the same first amendment rights that are at the core
of the candidate ballot access decisions: the rights of association and
expression.'
Just as undue restrictions on a candidate's ability to gain access to the
ballot have been held to burden first amendment interests in freedom of
association,I6 restrictions on the ability of private groups to initiate advisory
159. Consumers Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 109 (1980);
see also Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 336 (1981).
160. The district court simply assumed that Illinois had extended a right to place citizen-
sponsored advisory questions on local ballots. See Georges, 546 F. Supp. at 476-77.
161. See, e.g., City of Mt. Olive v. Braje, 366 Il1. 132, 135, 7 N.E.2d 851, 853 (1937) (voters
have no inherent or constitutional right to vote on public questions); Massachusetts Pub. In-
terest Research Group v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 85, 96, 375 N.E.2d 1175,
1182 (1978) (citizens do not have a fundamental interest in placing measures on the ballot).
162. Georges v. Carney, 546 F. Supp. 469, 477 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Courts consistently have
held that once a government creates a statutory right, that right must be conferred in a manner
consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546 (1975) (when state creates a public forum, it must provide procedural safeguards against
unconstitutional prior restraint of speech); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (government
is not constitutionally required to provide welfare benefits, but cannot terminate them without
procedural safeguards); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state must provide appellate
review in a nondiscriminatory manner even though appellate review is not constitutionally re-
quired); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp '703, 712 (D. Mass.
1978) ("It is a familiar constitutional principle that a state, though having acted when not
compelled, may consequentially create a constitutionally protected interest.").
163. See supra notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 84-115 and accompanying text.
165. Prior to Georges, only one court had considered a federal constitutional challenge to
a law regulating ballot propositions. See supra note 9.
166. 691 F.2d at 300. "[T]he candidate cases involve such different issues from those in
this case that we must treat this as a genuine case of first impression. Id.
167. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1572 (1983) (ballot access restric-
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 32:901
questions may impinge upon associational rights. As early as 1915, it was
recognized that "every measure submitted to the people has had some form
of organization behind it."' 69 Business, agricultural, labor, and public in-
terest groups, among others, often have viewed the initiative process to be
the best means of advancing their political beliefs.' 70 Indeed, some sponsors
of advisory question drives have used the campaigns as a means of develop-
ing political organizations.'' Statutes that place burdensome ballot access
restrictions on initiatives clearly impair the associational rights of those who
have chosen the initiative process to advance their political beliefs.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has noted that an election campaign is
an important form of political expression.' 72 The ability of third parties to
obtain ballot access has enabled their supporters to contribute new opinions
and beliefs to the marketplace of ideas.' 73 Similarly, placing advisory ques-
tions impinge upon associational choices protected by first amendment); Clements v. Fashing,
457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982) (ballot access requirements may burden first amendment interests
in ensuring freedom of association); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) (right to associate as a political party has diminished value if party
prevented from appearing on the ballot); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (restric-
tions on ballot access burden the right to associate for advancement of political beliefs); Man-
cuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 195 (1st Cir. 1973) (right to ballot access touches on freedom
of association); Greaves v. State Bd. of Elections, 508 F. Supp. 78, 80 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (restric-
tions on ballot access burden fundamental right to associate); Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp.
1095 (D. Md. 1980) (early filing deadline violates right to associate), aff'd, 636 F.2d 55 (4th
Cir. 1980).
169. J. BARNETT, supra note 23, at 18.
170. See Bone & Benedict, Perspectives on Direct Legislation: Washington State's Experience
1914-1973, 28 W. POL. Q. 330, 330-35 (1975). Although some commentators have argued that
moneyed "special interest" groups dominate the initiative process, see, e.g., Note, California
Initiative Process, supra 23, at 944 n.101 (two-thirds of initiatives submitted by wealthy pro-
ponents), other observers emphasize that many successful initiatives have been sponsored by
less affluent, ad hoc coalitions that were formed around a particular issue. See Bone & Benedict,
supra, at 333; Lee, supra note 51, at 106; Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Analysis
and Reassessment of a Western Phenomenon, W. POL. Q. 243, 260 (1975); Sirico, supra note
23, at 660-61.
171. See Note, Vietnam Peace Petitions, supra note 27, at 184. Many sponsors of advisory
questions on the Vietnam War hoped to use the initiative campaigns to develop competent
political organizations which would be able to compete with the established political parties. Id.
,172. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 186 (1979).
"lAin election campaign is a means of disseminating ideas as well as attaining political office.
Overbroad restrictions on ballot access jeopardize this form of political expression." Id. (cita-
tions omitted); cf. Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 195-96 (lst Cir. 1973) (becoming a can-
didate for office "may be the most important expression an individual can summon").
173. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1572 (1983); Illinois State Bd. of Elections
v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185-86 (1979). The Court's recognition of the impor-
tance of third parties to the vitality of the first amendment is underscored by its reluctance
to subject minor parties to financial disclosure laws. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Cam-
paign Comm., 103 S. Ct. 416 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Court has
noted that compelled disclosure of the names of campaign contributors and the recipients of
campaign expenditures could "cripple a minor party's ability to operate effectively and thereby
reduce 'the free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena.' " Brown
v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 103 S. Ct. 416, 423 (1982) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976)).
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tions on the ballot also is a form of political expression. The presence of
advisory questions, like the presence of independent and minor party can-
didates, introduces new ideas to the marketplace and stimulates public debate
of the issues.' 74 For many groups, the advisory question process may be
superior to other forms of expression such as picketing, leafletting, or speak-
ing in public. When an idea expressed in the form of an advisory question
is placed on the ballot, it generally is exposed to a larger number of people
than an idea expressed in a more traditional mode.'75 Moreover, the media
coverage accorded to ballot measures makes the advisory question a par-
ticularly effective means of expression. '76
Advisory questions not only provide their sponsors with a means of political
expression, they also furnish voters with an opportunity to express their views.
As one commentator noted, voting is the "most common means of political
expression in our mass society where many are unable to contribute monetar-
ily or lack time for volunteer effort."' 7 ' The presence of advisory questions
on the ballot enhances this method of expressing political preferences by
providing voters with an opportunity to vote directly on issues as well as
for candidates.' 78
In terms of their effect on first amendment rights, there is little difference
between undue restrictions on advisory questions and undue restrictions on
candidacy. Both impinge equally on the fundamental rights of association
and expression." 9 If the Georges court had recognized these similarities, it
may have employed an analysis more protective of the constitutional rights
of the advisory question sponsors and voters.'8 0
The public forum doctrine also provides useful guidelines for determining
the constitutional parameters of the right to place an advisory question on
the ballot. As previously noted,' 8 ' the Georges court indicated that a state,
by granting the right to place advisory questions on the ballot, transforms
the ballot into a forum for the expression of ideas.' 82 Considerable support
174. See Radin, Popular Legislation in California 1936-1946, 35 CAUF. L. REv. 171 (1947).
In his study of the California initiative process, Professor Radin noted that ballot proposals
often create "vigorous public discussion" in the weeks preceding the election. Id. at 173. Exten-
sive media coverage, formal debates on the proposals, and mass mailings conducted by pro-
ponents and opponents of the ballot measures all played a role in this discussion. Id. at 173-74.
175. See Comment, Local Initiative, supra note 27, at 472-73.
176. See Note, Vietnam Peace Petitions, supra note 27, at 191.
177. Elder, supra note 67, at 402.
178. Advisory questions also implicate another first amendment right closely related to political
expression: the right to petition for redress of grievances. See Brief for Appellant at 13, Georges
v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1982); Comment, Local Initiative, supra note 27, at 473.
If an advisory question is approved by the voters, it can be viewed as a formal request to
the government to pursue a certain policy. Id.
179. See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
182. 691 F.2d at 300-02. Although the Georges court never explicitly held that an advisory
question converts the ballot into a public forum, the notion is implicit throughout the court's
opinion. By framing the issue in terms of whether there is a "constitutional right to use the
ballot box as a forum for advocating policy," id. at 300, the court seemed to suggest that
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can be found for this novel concept. The requirement that the expressive
activity be compatible with the normal activity of the facility'83 is clearly
satisfied; advisory questions are no more disruptive of an election ballot than
are binding questions. In addition, although the Supreme Court recently has
displayed some reluctance to extend the public forum doctrine to include
a particular medium of expression,"' the principles underpinning public forum
analysis are as applicable to election ballots as they are to places or
locations.'85
Extension of the public forum doctrine to election ballots is consistent
with judicial efforts to guarantee a multiplicity of outlets for first amend-
ment expression.'86 A diversity of forums ensures that those who wish to
communicate their ideas can do so in an effective manner.' 87 As previously
indicated,'88 advisory questions have proven to be a particularly effective
means of expressing ideas to the community at large. As a public forum,
an election ballot also possesses an important attribute that other forums
do not possess; it provides an opportunity for less affluent groups to ex-
press their views to a wide audience. Although organizations often spend
large sums of money to place a measure on the ballot,' 89 several poorly
financed groups also have been able to qualify ballot measures."'
An extension of the public forum doctrine to ballots does not compel states
or localities to provide for advisory questions. A state or local government
if it had interpreted the Illinois statute as granting a right of ballot access for citizen-sponsored
advisory questions, it would have found local ballots in Illinois to be public forums.
183. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
184. See United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (public
forum doctrine does not extend to the mails and letterboxes). Factors unique to the postal
service may have prevented the Greenburgh Court from extending the public forum doctrine
to the mails. For example, the majority expressed concern that finding a public forum would
foreclose the use of locked letterboxes. Id. at 129. Furthermore, a concern with preventing
a loss of mail revenues may explain the Court's reluctance to permit placing unstamped materials
in letterboxes. See id. at 135 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 141-42 (White, J., concurring).
185. See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 659 n.41 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) ("There is no reason why the general principles applied in cases involving access
to places should not apply to our cases involving access to a particular medium of expres-
sion."), rev'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973). The Supreme Court never has indicated that the public forum doctrine necessarily
is limited to places. In fact, the Court has engaged in public forum analysis when the forum
arguably was a medium of expression. For example, in City of Madison Joint School Dist.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), the Court indicated that
governmental meetings open to the public are public forums. As one commentator noted, a
governmental meeting is "clearly a medium through which views are expressed .. " Note,
Access to Media, supra note 103, at 1435-36 n.90. The location of the meeting is irrelevant. Id.
186. See supra notes 85-93, 105-07 and accompanying text.
187. See Stone, supra note 84, at 251-52.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 169-71.
189. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
190. See Price, supra note 170, at 260. Some groups have spent as little as $9,000 to obtain
the sufficient number of signatures to qualify an initiative. Lee, supra note 51, at 101.
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is no more obligated to open its ballots to advisory questions than it is to
operate a theatre.' 9 ' The public forum doctrine simply states that once the
government opens its election ballots to the expression of ideas, it must do
so in a manner consistent with the first amendment.
Under either a public forum analysis or an analysis derived from the can-
didate ballot access cases, the Illinois advisory question scheme undoubtedly
would be invalidated. Although the Supreme Court, in its candidacy cases,
has recognized a compelling state interest in protecting the integrity of the
electoral process,'92 the Court consistently has invalidated ballot access restric-
tions that impinge upon first amendment rights.'93 In determining whether
signature requirements are unduly burdensome, the Court has considered
whether a reasonably diligent person could be expected to satisfy the
requirement. 9 " As the Georges court emphasized, by requiring the signatures
of twenty-five percent of the voters,'" Illinois has made it "practically im-
possible, at least in political subdivisions as populous as DuPage County
. . . . to put advisory questions on the ballot."' 96 By keeping all citizen-
sponsored questions off the ballot, the state clearly chose an unreasonable
means to effectuate its interests in limiting ballot length and ensuring that
citizen-sponsored questions enjoy sufficient community interest. A similar
signature requirement for independent or third party candidates surely would
be held unconstitutional.' 97
Additionally, the signature requirement would not survive scrutiny under
a public forum analysis. Although signature requirements can be considered
a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction,' 8 a state certainly cannot
make access to a forum virtually impossible.'" A variable percentage re-
quirement that is determined by the population of the political subdivision,
191. Cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (government is not
obligated to operate a theatre).
192. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (must have substantial regulations
of elections to ensure that they are fair, honest, and orderly); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134, 145 (1972) (state has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political
processes).
193. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979);
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 814 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
194. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 742 (1974). "Past experiences will be a helpful, if not
always an unerring guide: it will be one thing if . . . candidates have qualified with some
regularity and quite a different matter if they have not." Id.; see also Mandel v. Bradley,
432 U.S. 173, 177-78 (lower court required to examine difficulty of obtaining signature re-
quirements and the past success of independent candidates in achieving ballot access).
195. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 28-6 (1981).
196. 691 F.2d at 301.
197. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (invalidating a statute that effectively
excluded all independent and third party candidates from the ballot).
198. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1972).
199. See Georges, 691 F.2d at 303 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("A state cannot simultaneously
provide an avenue of political expression and burden its use with conditions that .. . can
never be met.").
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for example, would be a more reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction.200
The three-question limit, when combined with the first-come-first-served
procedure and the ability of governmental units to place propositions on
the ballot at will,"0 ' also would be invalidated under either analysis. As the
Georges dissent noted, the statutory scheme gives local governments the power
to preempt any citizen-sponsored advisory question by simply submitting three
government-sponsored questions before citizen groups have finished gather-
ing the requisite signatures for their measures. 0 2 The Supreme Court has
long recognized that when the state confers a first amendment right, it must
provide adequate procedural safeguards against unconstitutional government
censorship.0 3 The Illinois advisory question statutes contain no such pro-
cedural safeguards. 0 "
There are a number of possible alternatives to the present statutory scheme
that would be more protective of first amendment rights while still allowing
Illinois to maintain an orderly ballot. For example, Illinois could impose
a four-question limit and allocate two questions to governmental units and
two questions to citizen groups. 00 Alternatively, a lottery system could be
devised in which three questions would be randomlypicked for ballot place-
ment from all the questions submitted.20 6
The Georges decision is subject to criticism both for its interpretation of
the Illinois advisory question laws and, more importantly, for its failure to
recognize the first amendment implications of the Illinois advisory question
200. In New Jersey, for example, the signatures of 25% of the registered voters are required
to qualify an initiative for the ballot in a municipality with a population of less than 70,000.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:69A-184 (1967). The signature requirement is only 15% in cities with
a population of more than 70,000. Id.
201. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 28-1 (1981).
202. 691 F.2d at 305 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
203. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S.
175, 181 (1968).
204. The presence of the carryover provision, which permits any question prevented from
appearing on the ballot in one election to be included on the ballot in the next election, see
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 28-5 (1981), does not obviate the unconstitutionality of the three
question limit. As noted in the Georges dissent, the DuPage County Board submitted 11 ques-
tions for inclusion on the 1980 ballot just in time to prevent five citizen-sponsored tax reduc-
tion questions from appearing on the ballot. 691 F.2d at 303 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Since
only three questions can be placed on the ballot each election, the County Board could have
prevented the citizen-sponsored questions from appearing on the ballot for four or five elec-
tions. The delay between the submission of an advisory question and its appearance on the
ballot may dilute its effectiveness tremendously, especially if it concerns a timely issue. Moreover,
a delay may make it difficult for sponsors of advisory questions to maintain the organizational
structure and momentum necessary to mount an effective campaign for voter approval of the
measure. Brief for Appellant at 22, Georges v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1982).
205. Georges, 691 F.2d at 305 n.7 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
206. Brief for Appellant at 18, Georges v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1982).
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restrictions. By disregarding explicit statutory language and by engaging in
circular reasoning to support its conclusion that no right existed in Illinois
to place advisory questions on the ballot, the Georges court deprived Il-
linois citizens of an effective means of political expression. Although the
court correctly noted that Illinois is under no obligation to provide for an
advisory question process, it failed to recognize that by enacting the ad-
visory question scheme, Illinois created a right protected by the first
amendment.
EFFECT OF GEORGES
The recent efforts of the nuclear arms freeze movement to use the elec-
tion ballot as a means of publicizing its views increases the possibility of
future litigation involving ballot propositions. Other groups, encouraged by
the electoral success of the freeze questions,2"' may attempt to initiate their
own advisory questions and to challenge those ballot access restrictions that
prevent them from doing so. 2"8 Because Georges is one of the first cases
involving a constitutional challenge to a law regulating ballot propositions,
it is likely to influence the manner in which future challenges to these laws
are decided.
The effect Georges will have on future case law involving ballot proposi-
tions will depend upon which particular aspect of the decision courts follow.
Adoption of the Georges court's extremely deferential review of restrictions
on ballot propositions will adversely affect those who believe that advisory
questions are the most effective means of expressing their views. Even the
most restrictive ballot access laws would be upheld if courts were to apply
the Georges rationale that burdensome ballot restrictions are simply "an obli-
que way" of keeping all measures off the ballot.20 9 These applications would
be inconsistent with the first amendment principle of guaranteeing a multipli-
city of expressive modes." ' A failure to provide the same first amendment
protection to advisory questions that is afforded candidates for office will
eliminate a method of expression that a number of groups have found to
be particularly effective.2 1'
207. Organizers of the nuclear freeze movement claim that their efforts to place freeze pro-
posals on ballots and the subsequent voter approval of most of these measures, were extremely
helpful in demonstrating widespread public support for a nuclear arms freeze to the Reagan
administration. Nuclear Freeze Crusade Gaining or Waning?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr.
25, 1983, at 20. These organizers claim that the 1982 referendum victories pressured the Reagan
administration to begin arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Id.
208. Because most states do not expressly provide for citizen-initiated advisory questions,
it is likely that the majority of attempts to place these measures on the ballot will involve
broad readings of statutes and constitutional provisions that provide for binding initiatives.
See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
209. 691 F.2d at 301.
210. See supra notes 85-93, 105-07 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
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In addition, the Georges court's reasoning, if adopted by other courts,
may encourage legislative bodies to engage in the tactic of appearing to grant
a benefit without actually doing so. For example, a city council may yield
to citizen pressure by enacting an ordinance which ostensibly gives citizens
the power to recall city officials and yet make the requirements for placing
a recall measure on the ballot impossible to meet. As the Georges dissent
indicated, this tactic permits a legislative body to circumvent "those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation." 2 .2
On the other hand, an adoption of the public forum dicta of Georges
may afford advisory questions full first amendment protection. Under this
analysis, once a state provides for advisory questions, either directly or
through a broadly constructed binding initiative statute," 3 a public forum
would be deemed to have been created. Only valid time, place, and manner
restrictions, such as reasonable signature requirements and ballot length limita-
tions, could be upheld. 2 ' This dicta in Georges may prove to be the most
significant aspect of the decision. In cases in which a right to initiate ad-
visory questions unquestionably has been granted, the Georges dicta pro-
vides courts with support for extending full constitutional protection to ad-
visory questions.
CONCLUSION
The Georges decision represents one of the first judicial pronouncements
on the constitutionality of restrictions on the initiative process. Accordingly,
though the precise implications of Georges are difficult to ascertain, it un-
doubtedly will have a significant effect on future decisions involving both
binding and advisory initiatives. The court's erroneous conclusion that Il-
linois citizens lack the right to initiate advisory questions on local ballots
might encourage other courts to engage in the same legal fiction to uphold
burdensome ballot access restrictions. Alternatively, the Georges court's in-
troduction of the public forum theory to ballot access restriction analysis
ultimately might result in added protection of advisory initiatives.
Nevertheless, the Georges court's unwillingness to scrutinize more closely
the Illinois advisory question restrictions is unfortunate. By basing much of
its decision on the specious conclusion that the state did not intend to grant
its citizens the power to initiate advisory questions, the Georges court failed
to recognize that the Illinois advisory question scheme impinged upon rights
endemic to the American electoral process: the right to speak freely, the
right to associate politically, and the right to vote effectively. While it may
212. 691 F.2d at 304 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
213. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
214. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1972).
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be true that there are "few issues less suitable for judges than determining
the manageable length of the ballot," 2 ' it is equally true that there are few
tasks more important for the judiciary than protecting our most cherished
constitutional rights.
Joseph A. Moore
215. Georges, 691 F.2d at 302.

